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Abstract—Mining in the blockchain requires high
computing power to solve the hash puzzle for example
proof-of-work puzzle. It takes high cost to achieve
the calculation of this problem in devices of IOT,
especially the mobile devices of IOT. It consequently
restricts the application of blockchain in mobile envi-
ronment. However, edge computing can be utilized to
solve the problem for insufficient computing power
of mobile devices in IOT. Edge servers can recruit
many mobile devices to contribute computing power
together to mining and share the reward of mining
with these recruited mobile devices. In this paper, we
propose an incentivizing mechanism based on edge
computing for mobile blockchain. We design a two-
stage Stackelberg Game to jointly optimize the reward
of edge servers and recruited mobile devices. The
edge server as the leader sets the expected fee for the
recruited mobile devices in Stage I. The mobile device
as a follower provides its computing power to mine
according to the expected fee in Stage. It proves that
this game can obtain a uniqueness Nash Equilibrium
solution under the same or different expected fee. In
the simulation experiment, we obtain a result curve
of the profit for the edge server with the different
ratio between the computing power from the edge
server and mobile devices. In addition, the proposed
scheme has been compared with the MDG scheme for
the profit of the edge server. The experimental results
show that the profit of the proposed scheme is more
than that of the MDG scheme under the same total
computing power.
Keywords—Edge computing, Incentivizing mecha-
nism, propagation, Game theory, mobile blockchain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online payment has become an indispensable
way of payment in people’s life. In order to en-
sure the security of payment, online payment is
achieved through an authoritative agent. However,
the cost of establishing an authority is enormous,
which increases the cost of payment. Blockchain
technology can realize P2P payment[1]. Blockchain
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is a distributed ledger that is copied synchronously
across multiple users, which differs from the tra-
ditional centralized ledger, and Bitcoin is used to
solve the dual payment problem[2]. Blockchain
has surpassed its original design and become the
basic technology to realize decentralized control.
Compared with centralized control, the blockchain
system has the advantages of distributed high re-
dundancy storage, time sequence data, tamper-
resistant and forgery, decentralized credit, auto-
matic execution of smart contracts, security and
privacy protection.
The key process of blockchain is a calculation
process to solve the hash puzzle, which requires
high computing power. However, the mobile de-
vices in IOT have insufficient computing power.
Therefore, edge computing has been paid more
and more attention of scholars[3][4]. The target
of edge computing is to enable a large number
of devices to run applications on IOT, which en-
ables these devices to provide their computing
power for mining[5]. Therefore, it is a trend that
edge computing is used to solve the hash puzzle
in blockchain[6]. By combining blockchain with
edge computing, edge servers can organize a large
number of devices to provide computing power,
storage resources, etc. It can greatly improve the
transmission efficiency of the system and ensure
data integrity and computing effectiveness. With
the participation of edge computing, the blockchain
system obtains a large number of computing power
on IOT, which reduces the burden of computing
power limited devices for mining. It enables out
of chain storage and out of chain computing of
edge computing to be realized, and satisfies scalable
storage and computing on the blockchain[7].
However, blockchain is not widely used in mo-
bile environment. Due to the limited computing
power of mobile devices, it costs too much to solve
the POW puzzle. Therefore, we need to further
research the mining strategy in the mobile envi-
ronment to promote the application of blockchain
in IOT. The incentive mechanism based on edge
computing is considered to overcome the lack of
computing power in mobile devices and satisfies
the requirement of mining. Edge servers act as
miner, but the number is small, while the number of
mobile devices is large. Therefore, the system en-
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2courages the edge server to actively recruit mobile
devices to provide computing power to complete
the mining task. When the mining is successful,
the edge server and the mobile device share the
rewards. The contributions of this work are mainly
shown as follows.
i) We discuss the challenges of mobile
blockchain in mining. In order to address the
challenge for high cost of mining by mobile
devices alone, the edge server recruit mobile
devices to provide computing power to mine
and share the profit with them. In order to
make them obtain the maximum profit, this
paper formulates a two-stage Stackelberg
game model to set the profit distribution of
mining.
ii) We adopt backward induction to prove that the
uniqueness Nash equilibrium solution exists in
this game under the same expected fee and
different expected fee.
iii) We show the result curve of the profit for the
edge server with the different ratio between
the computing power from the edge server
and mobile devices. The results show that the
contribution of the computing power from the
edge server to its profit is more than that of
it recruited mobile devices under the same
condition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Related work is briefly reviewed in Section II. In
Section III, we give out the detail of system model
and problem formulation. In Section IV, Game
Equilibrium is analyzed. Performance evaluation
and analysis are given in Section related work is
briefly introduced. We give out the detail of system
model and problem formulation in Section III. We
analyze Game Equilibrium in Section V. The last
Section is conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, the technology of integrating
blockchain into edge computing has gradually at-
tracted the attention of scholars. In [8], the authors
designed an architecture to combine blockchain
technology with edge computing. It achieves the
fine management of different department data. They
implement the synchronization of data storage and
processing by deploying regional blockchain, and
reach an agreement through sharing. In [9], the
author overcomes the constraints of the Inter-
net of things by combining edge computing and
blockchain. It can ensure the security and privacy
of Internet of things devices when it translates
sensitive personal data. Therefore, it can make
IOT devices get rid of the dependence on storage
devices and improve the overall performance. In
[10], the author designs an architecture combining
edge intelligence with blockchain authorization to
achieve efficient edge service management. For
edge resource sharing, they designed a cross do-
main scheduling mechanism, and used the credit
approval mechanism to ensure security, which can
reduce service costs and improve service capabili-
ties.
Many researches have been carried out on the
mining scheme of blockchain by formulating game
model. Houy [11]proposed a noncooperative game
model in the mining process. In this model, the
events of POW puzzle follow Poisson distribution.
When the equilibrium point of Nash is reached,
the optimal solution of both sides is obtained, but
only the equilibrium solution between two min-
ers is obtained. Kiayias et al [12]considered the
mining of miners as a competitive game process.
Assuming that the miners are rational, they compete
for mining and choose whether to broadcast their
solutions based on their profit. It is found that
under some conditions, the optimal solution is not
to propagate. In addition, the authors proved that
there is multiplicity of Nash equilibrium in this
model. Similar to [12], L.Wang and Y. Liu [13]
considered the mining of miners as a random game
model. The miners decide whether to propagate the
block according to the estimation of reward.
The traditional mining of miners in the
blockchain is carried out individually. The
advantage of mining by miners alone is that when
miners successfully calculate the hash value that
meets the conditions, they can obtain all rewards.
However, this mining scheme is inefficient and has
unstable earnings. In order to obtain stable rewards,
researchers have introduced mine pools, which is
another way to concentrate resources to mining
blocks[14]. Lewenberg et al [15] proposed the
mining scheme of blockchain based on cooperative
game. They use the theoretical tool of cooperative
game to research the mining pool that miners
would like to join and reasonably shared their
rewards. The interaction between the miner and
the mining pool is simulated as a joint game. In
order to the data processing in the Internet of
things authorized by the blockchain, [16] proposed
a multi-hop cooperative distributed algorithm to
achieve the mining tasks. They set the competition
among devices as a game problem to reduce
the computing cost of Internet of things devices.
Each device can decide its own computing power
to obtain the maximum benefit. The researchers
found that when the scheme is applied to bitcoin
network, some miners always turn to other mines
for higher expected rewards under any incentive
allocation scheme
However, the above research works are to use
dedicated nodes to mine, without considering the
3application of mobile environment. In the mobile
Internet environment, the computing power of a
single mobile smart device is often limited, but the
number of these devices is large. Therefore, it is
a new opportunity for blockchain application that
edge servers organize a large number of mobile
devices, and make use of their idle computing
power to contribute computing power to mining.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
III-A. System Model
The process of consensus management contains
these steps as following: Block broadcast, Mining,
Progagation, Verification, Confirm and Add new
block. The data block that contains transaction
records is periodically broadcasted in blockchain
network. These transaction records are the issued
transactions. The miners will solve a crypto-puzzle
by theirs computing power according to given pa-
rameters of the blockchain [17]. If the miner suc-
cessfully solves the given puzzle, it propagates the
result and block to other miners in the blockchain
system to verify. The fastest miner who solves
the puzzle and passes the verification will obtain
the reward R of blockchain system. To finish the
computation and propagation as soon as possible,
the edge servers recruit the mobile devices to
compute beside theirselves. The verification tasks
are completely handed over to the mobile devices.
Each mobile device is assigned the computation
and verification task according to its computing
power by edge servers and then get reward from
the edge server that recruited it. Each edge server
should share the given reward from the blockchain
to mobile devices based on their contributions. In
addition, the calculation and verification of blocks
will generate communication overhead.
III-B. Problem Formulation
Let E = {E1, · · · , Ex} represents a group
of edge servers. Each edge server recruits mo-
bile devices(denoted by M = {M1, · · · ,My})
to provide computation and verification services.
The miners compete with each other to mine. The
fastest miner who solves the puzzle and passes the
verification will obtain the reward of blockchain
system. The reward consists of fixed reward R
and variable transaction reward TR. For miner Ei,
the probability of success in mining is determined
by its computing power, which is represented by
Pr = αe−γzT [11], where α is factor about the
computing power.
αi(xi,M−1) = xi∑
j∈M xj
, αi > 0 (1)
and
∑
j∈M αj = 1. The process of solving puz-
zle follows Poisson distribution, and γ is Poisson
parameter[18]. z > 0 represents a delay factor
in transmission, and T represents the number of
transactions in one block.
The profit of the edge server Ei contain the three
parts as follow: 1) The fixed reward from mining;
2)the cost for mobile device charging; 3)electricity
and other costs. The utility function of edge servers
is formulated as follow:
Ue = (R+ TR)e
−γzT −
n∑
i=1
fi − Φ. (2)
The profit of mobile devices contain the three
parts as follow: 1)The expected fee provided by
edge server; 2)mined block verification; 3)electric-
ity and other costs. The profit function of mobile
devices is formulated as follow:
Um = fi
xi∑
j∈M xj
e−γzTm − ϕxi. (3)
fi is the reward from edge server depend on its
computing power.ϕ is the resource about computing
power, memory and so on.
The process of mining block between the edge
server and mobile devices is designed as a two-
stage Stackelberg game. The edge server acts as
leader. It sets the expected fee for mobile devices
in Stage I. The mobile devices act as follower. They
provide their computing power for the leader in
Stage II. Obviously, for followers, if the expected
fee is less than their own consumption, they will
not accept the recruitment of leaders. The minimum
consumption of a mobile miner is defined as ωmin.
Therefore, the expected fee given by leader to each
mobile miner must be greater than the consumption
value of follower. Then the objective functions of
leaders and followers can be expressed as follows:
Leader : maxF (xi)
1 ≥ αi > 0
Follower : maxf(ω)
ω > ωmin (4)
IV. GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In our model, we consider two situations for
mobile devices as follow: the same computer power
for each miner and the different computer power for
each miner. The traditional backward induction[18]
will be adoped to analyze this game.
4IV-A. The same computer power for each miner
1) Stage II: Miner’s Game: we first analyze the
simple situation that is the same computing power
for each miner. These miners can be considered
as a entirety, and their total computer power is Y .
The computing power from the edge server is X .
Then, the miners compete with the edge server to
maximize their profit by providing their computer
power, which forms the Edge Miner Game(EMG)
Em = {E,M, Um}. E is the edge server, M is
the group of mobile miners recruited by the edge
server, Um represents the utility function of mobile
miners. Therefore, the profit function of mobile
miners, in Stage II, is represented as:
Um = P
Y
X + Y
e−γzTm − ϕ1Y. (5)
where P is expected fee of miners from edge server.
Theorem 1. There is a Nash equilibrium in
Em = {E,M, Um}
proof. The computer power space of each miner
is a continuous and non-empty value range. Um is
obviously continuous with respect to Y . Let α =
Y
X+Y . Then, we prove the concavity of Um. Um
will be concave if it satisfy the two condition: the
first derivative of Um with respect to Y is positive
and the second derivative of Um with respect to Y
is negative. The process is as following.
∂Um
∂Y
= P
∂α
∂Y
− ϕ1 (6)
and
∂2Um
∂Y 2
= P
∂2α
∂Y 2
(7)
where
∂α
∂Y
=
X
(X + Y )2
> 0 (8)
and
∂2α
∂Y 2
= − 2X
(X + Y )3
< 0 (9)
Therefore, Um satisfies the concave condition
with respect to Y . According to [19], the Nash
equilibrium is in the EMG Em.
Let (6)=0, we can get the best function of miners
as following,
∂Um
∂Y
= Pe−γzTm
∂α
∂Y
− ϕ1 = 0 (10)
Y ∗ = F (x) =
√
Pe−γzTmX
ϕ1
−X (11)
Theorem 2.There is a unique Nash equilibrium
in EMG Em if the following condition is satisfied
X < min
P>0
{
∫
Pe−γzTm
4ϕ1
dX ,
P e−γzTm
ϕ1
} (12)
Let Y ∗ represent the Nash equilibrium of the
EMG. If Y ∗ = F (Y ) is the standard func-
tion, then the EMG Em exists the unique Nash
equilibrium[19].
Definition 1. A funciton F (x) is a standard
function if the following three conditions are
satisfied[19]:
(1)F (x) is positive.
(2)F (x) is monotonous. It is formulated as: if
x ≤ x′, then F (x) ≤ F (x′);
(3)F (x) is scalable. It is formulated as: for all
λ > 1, then λF (x) > F (λx);
Firstly, for F (x) > 0, from (11), we have
IfX <
Pe−γzTm
ϕ1
, then
√
Pe−γzTmX
ϕ1
−X > 0 (13)
Under the condition in (12), we can obtain√
Pe−γzTmX
ϕ1
−X > 0 (14)
Secondly, Let X ′ ≥ X , we calculate the formula
of F (X ′)− F (X), which is shown in (13). Obvi-
ously,
√
X ′ −√X ≥ 0. In addition,√
Pe−γzTm
ϕ1
−
√
X ′ −
√
X ≥√
Pe−γzTm
ϕ1
− 2
√
X ′ (15)
Under the condition in (12), we can prove that√
Pe−γzTm
ϕ1
− 2
√
X ′ ≥ 0 (16)
Thus, F ′(X)− F (x) ≥ 0.
Finally, for condition(3) of Definition 1. We
prove the formula of λF (x) > F (λx) with respect
to λ > 1. The process of calculation is shown in
(14).
Therefore, the three conditions shown in Defini-
tion 1 have been proved for the response function
in (11). The process of proof has done..
From above, we can obtain that the uniqueness
Nash equilibrium for miners is true in EMG Em
when Y ∗ =
√
Pe−γzTmX
ϕ1
−X . And now, we need
to analyze the optimal profit of the edge server in
the first stage.
2) Stage I: Edge server’s optimal profit: Accord-
ing to the Nash equilibrium of the computer power
5provided by mobile miners in EMG Em, the Edge
Server is as leader that can optimize its computer
power to achieve its optimal profit represented in
(2). For the edge server, the computer power X
belongs to itself. The revenue generated by this
part of computing power X belongs to the edge
server. What we need to analyze is the additional
benefits of the computing power from the edge
server recruiting mobile miners. The total computer
power provided by miners is Y . Therefore, the
additional benefits for the edge server represented
as:
∆Ue = (R+ TR)
Y
X + Y
e−γzTm − P (17)
Thus, by substituting (11) into (17), and let
a = (R + TR)e−γzTm , the additional profit maxi-
mization of the edge server is simplified as:
maximize
P>0
∆Ue = a(1−
√
Xϕ1
Pe−γzTm
) (18)
Theorem 3. Under the same computer power of
miners, the Edge Server can achieve the optimal
profit.
proof. From (18), We proof that the first deriva-
tive of ∆Ue with respect to the expected fee of
miners P is positive and the second derivative of
∆Ue with respect to P is negative as following.
∂∆Ue
∂P
=
1
2
√
Xϕ1e−γzTmP−
3
2 > 0 (19)
and
∂2∆Ue
∂P 2
= −3
4
√
Xϕ1e−γzTmP−
5
2 < 0 (20)
From (19) and (20), ∆Ue is strictly concavity
that can be satisfied. Therefore, the EMG Em can
obtain the optimal profit with the situation for the
same computer power of miners. The process of
proof has done.
IV-B. the different computer power for each miner
1) Stage II: Miner’s Game: in this situation, the
edge server and mobile devices are the miners for
mining. The additional benefits for the edge server
is represented as:
∆Ue = (R+ TR)
xi∑
j∈M
xj
e−γzTm −
∑
i∈M
pixi (21)
and the utility function of miner i is represented as:
Um = pi
xi∑
j∈M
xj
e−γzTm − ϕ2xi. (22)
Theorem 4. There is a Nash equilibrium in
Em = {E,M,Um}
proof. For computer power space of each miner
xi, it is a continuous and non-empty value range.
In order to proof the concavity of Um in (22), we
calculate the first derivative of Um and the second
derivative of Um with respect to xi. The process is
as following:
∂Um
∂xi
= Pie
−γzTm ∂α
∂xi
− ϕ2 (23)
and
∂2Um
∂x2i
= Pie
−γzTm ∂
2α
∂x2i
(24)
where
∂α
∂xi
=
∑
i 6=j
xi
(
∑
j∈M
xj)2
> 0 (25)
F (x′)− F (x) =
√
Pe−γzTmX ′
ϕ1
−X ′ − (
√
Pe−γzTmX
ϕ1
−X)
=
√
Pe−γzTm
ϕ1
(
√
X ′ −
√
X)− (X ′ −X)
= (
√
Pe−γzTm
ϕ1
−
√
X ′ −
√
X)(
√
X ′ −
√
X) (13)
λF (x)− F (λX) = λ
√
Pe−γzTmX
ϕ1
− λX − (
√
Pe−γzTmλX
ϕ1
− λX)
= (λ−
√
λ)
√
Pe−γzTmX
ϕ1
(14)
6F (x′)− F (x) = (
√
Pe−γzTm
ϕ2
−
√∑
i6=j
x′j −
√∑
i 6=j
xj)(
√∑
i 6=j
x′j −
√∑
i 6=j
xj) (32)
λF (xi)− F (λxi) = (λ−
√
λ)
√√√√Pe−γzTm ∑i 6=j xj
ϕ2
(33)
and
∂2α
∂x2i
= −2
∑
i 6=j
xi
(
∑
j∈M
xj)3
< 0 (26)
Therefore, Um satisfies the concave condition
with respect to xi. According to [19], the Nash
equilibrium is in the EMG Em. Let (22)=0, we
can get the best response function of miners as
following.
∂Um
∂xi
= pie
−γzTm ∂α
∂xi
− ϕ2 = 0 (27)
x∗i = F (x) =
√√√√pie−γzTm ∑i 6=j xj
ϕ2
−
∑
i 6=j
xj (28)
Theorem 5. There is a unique Nash equilibrium
in EMG Em if the following condition is satisfied
2(M − 1)
pi
<
∑
j∈M
1
pj
(29)
Let x∗i represent the Nash equilibrium of the
EMG. If x∗i = F (x) satisfies the three condition of
the standard function shown in Definition 1, then
the EMG exists a unique Nash equilibrium [19].
Firstly, for the positivity, we need to prove∑
i 6=j
xj <
pie
−γzTm
ϕ2
. Let (38) minus (35), we have
∑
i 6=j
xj =
ϕ2
pie−γzTm
(
M − 1∑
j∈M
ϕ2
pie−γzTm
)2 (30)
Under the condition of (29), we have∑
i 6=j
xj <
pie
−γzTm
4ϕ2
(31)
It is easily to obtain
∑
i 6=j
xj <
pie
−γzTm
ϕ2
. Thus, it
satisfies the positivity.
Secondly, for the Monotonicity, we calculate
F (x′) − F (x) under the condition x′ ≥ x. It is
similar with (13). We have (32).
Obiously,
√∑
i 6=j
x′j −
√∑
i 6=j
xj > 0, and we have√
pie−γzTm
ϕ2
−
√∑
i 6=j
x′j −
√∑
i 6=j
xj ∈
(
√
pie−γzTm
ϕ2
− 2
√∑
i 6=j
x′j ,√
pie−γzTm
ϕ2
− 2
√∑
i 6=j
xj) (34)
From (31), we can obtian
√
pie−γzTm
ϕ2
−
2
√∑
i 6=j
xj > 0. Thus, it is obviously exist the
condition that satisfies F (x′) − F (x) > 0. The
proof is now completed.
Finally, for condition(3) of Definition 1. We
prove the formula of λF (xi) > F (λxi) in the
condition as λ > 1. From (33), we can obtain it.
Theorem 6. In EMG Em, the unique Nash equi-
librium solution of computing power for a miner i
is shown by
x∗i =
M − 1∑
j∈M
ϕ2
pie−γzTm
− ϕ2
pie−γzTm
(
M − 1∑
j∈M
ϕ2
pie−γzTm
)2 (35)
proof. From (27), we obtain∑
i 6=j
xj
(
∑
j∈M
xj)2
=
ϕ2
pie−γzTm
(36)
Then, for all the miners, we calculate the sum of
the above formula as following:
(M − 1)
∑
i 6=j
xj
(
∑
j∈M
xj)2
=
∑
j∈M
ϕ2
pie−γzTm
(37)
Thus, we can get∑
j∈M
xj =
M − 1∑
j∈M
ϕ2
pie−γzTm
(38)
7From (28), we have
∑
j∈M
xj =
√√√√pie−γzTm ∑i 6=j xj
ϕ2
(39)
which means
∑
j∈M
xj =
√√√√pie−γzTm( ∑j∈M xj − xi)
ϕ2
(40)
By substituting (38) to (40), we have
M − 1∑
j∈M
ϕ2
pie−γzTm
=
√√√√pie−γzTm
ϕ2
(
M − 1∑
j∈M
ϕ2
pie−γzTm
− xi) (41)
We will get the Nash equilibrium solution of
computing power for miner i with mathematical
operation. The process of proof has done.
Therefore, we can adopt the solution for obtain-
ing the Nash equilibrium for the edge server. We
will analyze the optimal profit in Stage I.
2) Stage I: Edge Server’s optimal profit: It is
similar to IV-A. What we need to analyze is the
additional benefits of the computing power from
the edge server recruiting mobile miner i. The
computer power provided by miner i is xi. There-
fore, the additional benefits for the edge server
represented as:
∆Ue = (R+ TR)
xi∑
j∈M
xj
e−γzTm − pi (42)
Thus, by substituting (35) and (38) into (42), and
let a = (R + TR)e−γzTm , the additional profit
maximization of the edge server is simplified as:
maximize
pi>0
∆Ue = a(1− M − 1
pi
∑
j∈M
1
pj
) (43)
Theorem 7. Under the different computer power
of each miner i, the Edge Server can achieve the
optimal profit.
proof. From (43), we can calculate the first
derivative of ∆Ue with respect to the expected fee
pi of miner i is positive and that of the second
derivative of ∆Ue is negative as following:
∂∆Ue
∂pi
=
a(M − 1)∑
i 6=j
1
pj
(pi
∑
j∈M
1
pj
)2
> 0 (44)
and
∂2∆Ue
∂p2i
=
−2a(M − 1)(∑
i6=j
1
pj
)2
(pi
∑
j∈M
1
pj
)3
< 0 (45)
From (44) and (45), ∆Ue is strictly concavity
that can be satisfied. Therefore, the EMG Em can
obtain the optimal profit with the situation for the
different computer power of miners. The process of
proof has done.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We will evaluate the performance of the incen-
tivizing mechanism in EMG proposed in this paper.
We consider an edge server that recruits a set
of mobile devices to mine in mobile blockchain
system. We adopt algorithm I to achieve the unique
Stackelberg Equilibrium solution for miners. Then
the edge server maximizes its profit by substituting
the expected fee of miners. For a given expected fee
imposed by EMG, the following sub game is solved
first. The optimal response of follower game is
substituted into leader game, and the optimal price
is obtained. Similar algorithms can also be used for
the situation of different fee provided by the edge
server. We set 1000 blocks adopting Node.js[20].
To simplify the experiment, the size of block is the
same and there are 10 transactions exist in each
block to mine.
Firstly, we evaluate the probability of successful
mining versus the computing power of edge server.
The computing power from the edge server is
the critical factor that decides the probability of
successfully mining block, as shown in Fig 1.
Fig. 1. The probability of mining successful vs The
computing power of the edge server
We secondly investigate the optimal expected
fee for mobile devices under the same computing
power versus the fixed reward R by blockchain
system.
8Algorithm 1 The Algorithm for finding Stackelberg
Equilibrium under the same expected fee
Input: initial expected fee p0, parameter θ ,
precision threshold ε
Output: the optimal expected fee popt, the com-
puting power of miner ci, the count of successful
mining S
1: Initialization:
2: Set initial p0, parameter θ ∈ (0, 1), precision
threshold ε > 0
3: Let X1, · · · , Xn be n independent random 0-1
variables, where Xi takes 1 with the successful
mining of miner i.
4: Repeat:
5: Each miner i provides its computing power ci
to mine
6: If the mining is successful, Xi=1
7: pi+1 = pi(1 + θ)
8: i← i+ 1
9: Until:
10: pi+1 − pi < 0 and |pi+1−pi|pi < ε
11: S =
n∑
i=1
Xi
12: Return:
13: popt = pi, ci, S
Fig. 2. The optimal expected fee vs Fixed reward for
successfully mining
The Fig 2 shows that the optimal expected fee
for mobile devices increase with the increasing of
the fixed reward R. The fixed reward is higher, the
expected fee of the edge server is higher. Miners are
more willing to respond to the recruitment of edge
servers to provide higher computing power to mine.
Therefore, the edge server can provide a higher
expected fee to recruit mobile devices and obtain
higher computing power to improve the probability
of mining success, and thus obtain greater profit.
Thus, with the increase of fixed rewards provided
by blockchain system, the individual computing
power provided by each miner also increases.
We next evaluate two situations for the profit of
Edge Server versus the different computing power
of recruited miners and the different computing
power provided by edge server under the same total
computing power for them. The first one is that
the computing power from edge server is set to
50 constantly, and when the computing power of
this recruited mobile devices increases, the reward
curve of the edge server changes. Another is that
the total computing power of mobile miners is
set to 50, and when the computing power from
edge server increases, the reward curve of the edge
server changes accordingly. From Fig 3, we find
that the profit of the edge server increase rapidly
with the increase of recruited mobile devices in the
initial stage. Thats because, in the initial stage, with
the mobile devices recruited by the edge server,
the computing power is increased rapidly, and the
probability of mining success is increased, so the
reward is increased. However, with the addition of
more mobile devices, the increasing probability of
mining success is not obvious, but the edge server
still has to pay the corresponding remuneration, so
the cost increases sharply, and the total income
increases slowly. In addition, under the different
computing power for each mobile device, the profit
of the edge server increases with the increase of
total computing power compared with that under
the same computing power of mobile devices. How-
ever, Fig 4 shows that when the computing power
from edge server accounts for a larger proportion of
the total computing power, there is little difference
between the benefits of the edge server under the
two situations. Thats because the edge server is
dominant in that case, and the computing power
from mobile device is little and makes little contri-
bution to mining.
Fig. 3. The profit of the edge server vs The total
computing power of miners
Finally, we compare the profit of edge server
in EMG with MDG[21]. For the EMG, we con-
sider that the computing power of the edge server
accounts for 10%, 50% and 90% of the total
9Fig. 4. The profit of the edge server vs The computing
power of the edge server
computing power respectively. In addition, the total
computing power that provided by all miners in two
schemes is the same. We investigate the profit of
the edge server versus the total computing power.
From Fig 5 and Fig 6, we can find that the profit of
the edge server in both schemes increases with the
increase of the total computing power. However, the
profit of the scheme proposed in this because the
edge server itself participates in mining, reducing
the information transmission delay and improving
the efficiency. In the EMG method, the edge server
does not participate in mining, and all mining
tasks are assigned to the mobile device, which
will generate a large communication cost and a
large delay, so it reduces the probability of mining
success and reduces the profit of the edge server
Fig. 5. The profit of the edge server vs The total
computing power under the different computing power
provided by miners
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discuss the challenges of mo-
bile blockchain in mining. In order to address the
challenges of high mining cost for mobile de-
vices, this paper proposes an incentive mechanism
based on edge computing. We developed a two-
stage Stackelberg Game model to jointly optimize
Fig. 6. The profit of the edge server vs The total com-
puting power under the same computing power provided
by miners
the reward of edge servers and recruited mobile
devices. The edge server recruits mobile devices
to compete with it in mining. The edge server
sets the expected fee according to the computing
power of the mobile device, and the mobile device
provides the computing power for the edge server.
We prove that there is a unique Nash Equilibrium
solution in this game under the same expected fee
or different expected fee. In addition, we show the
result curve of the profit for the edge server with
the different ratio between the computing power
from edge server and mobile devices. The results
show that the contribution of the computing power
from the edge server to its profit is more than
that of it recruited mobile devices under the same
condition. In addition, the proposed scheme has
been compared with the MDG scheme for the profit
of the edge server. The results show that the profit
of the proposed scheme is more than that of the
MDG scheme under the same conditions.
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